

Message Text

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652:XGDS-3 IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE

TAGS:PARM, OTRA (ENMOD)

SUBJECT: ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION DISCUSSIONS

ENMOD MESSAGE NUMBER TWO

DELIVER TO PIERCE CORDEN BY OPENING OF BUSINESS NOV 1.

THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN APPROVED FOR THE
GUIDANCE OF THE US DELEGATION TO THE FIRST ROUND OF US-
SOVIET BILATERAL TALKS PURSUANT TO THE AGREED JOINT STATE-
MENT OF JULY 3, 1974, ON QUOTE DANGERS OF MILITARY USE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION. UNQUOTE

1. OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE PRESENT TALKS ARE:

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(A) TO EXPLORE AND ASSESS THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SOVIET INTEREST IN MEASURES TO OVERCOME THE DANGERS OF THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES;

(B) TO ASSESS THE PROSPECT OF EVENTUALLY ARRIVING AT A COMMON APPROACH, AND TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET SIDE THAT SUCH AN APPROACH CANNOT BE EXPECTED ON THE BASIS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION THE SOVIET UNION HAS INTRODUCED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY;

(C) TO DETERMINE TO THE EXTENT PRACTICAL WHETHER THERE ARE SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES WHICH THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE AN INTEREST IN DEVELOPING FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.

2. IN PURSUING THESE OBJECTIVES, THE DELEGATION SHOULD REMAIN WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE AGREED JOINT STATEMENT OF JULY 3 AND SUBSEQUENT POLICY DECISIONS.

3. THE DELEGATION SHOULD STRESS THE NEED FOR A SATISFACTORY CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO DEFINING THE SUBJECT MATTER OF ANY MEASURES, AND FOR DIFFERENTIATING MEASURES CONCERNED WITH THIS MATTER FROM:

(A) OTHER ARMS CONTROL PROBLEMS;

(B) THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF WEAPONS; AND

(C) OTHER QUOTE ENVIRONMENTAL UNQUOTE PROBLEMS. IN THIS REGARD, THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE US SEES THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBSTANTIAL INTERNATIONAL CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY IF ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO DEFINE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF SPECIAL CONCERN IN THIS AREA IN A MANNER WHICH DUPLICATED IN WHOLE OR IN PART MATTERS CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF: OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS OR AGREEMENTS, THE LAW OF WAR, OR AGREEMENTS OR STANDARDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AS SUCH.

4. THE DELEGATION MAY POINT OUT THAT WHILE ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES HAVE ANCILLARY ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS AND THAT

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WHILE IN SOME INSTANCES THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT IS DIRECT AND INTENTIONAL, THERE IS, IN THE US VIEW, A DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUCH CASES AND THE CONCEPT OF QUOTE ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE UNQUOTE. IN THE US VIEW, THE LATTER WOULD NOT ONLY AFFECT VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTS BUT ALSO REPRESENT AN EFFORT TO RELEASE OR MANIPULATE, THROUGH THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES, NATURAL PROCESSES OR FORCES FOR PURPOSES OF DESTRUCTION OR DISRUPTION DIRECTED AGAINST AN

ADVERSARY.

5. THE DELEGATION MAY CALL ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT FOR THE MOST PART SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES HAVE NOT BEEN DEMONSTRATED; CONSEQUENTLY, CONSTRAINING MEASURES WOULD HAVE TO DEAL LARGELY WITH CURRENTLY UNKNOWN TECHNIQUES WHICH MIGHT EMERGE IN TIME.

6. THE DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK REAFFIRMATION OF THE AGREEMENT REFLECTED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT THAT MEASURES

SHOULD BE CONCERNED WITH THE QUOTE DANGERS UNQUOTE OF MILITARY USES, THAT IS, IN THE US VIEW, THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES AS QUOTE WEAPONS UNQUOTE (IN CONTRAST WITH NON-WEAPONS USES).

7. REGARDING CIVIL APPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES, THE DELEGATION SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FACT THAT THE AGREED JOINT STATEMENT DEALS ONLY WITH MILITARY USES.

8. CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED JOINT STATEMENT, THE DELEGATION SHOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF PRECLUDING THOSE QUOTE WEAPONS UNQUOTE USES OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES WHICH MIGHT HAVE WIDESPREAD, LONG LASTING, OR SEVERE EFFECTS. THE DELEGATION SHOULD POINT OUT THAT SUCH USES, ALTHOUGH NOW LARGELY HYPOTHETICAL, MIGHT HAVE PROFOUND ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF MAN AND NATURE AND ON RELATIONS AMONG STATES. THE DELEGATION MAY OFFER HYPOTHETICAL ILLUSTRATIONS BUT SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT ANY SUCH ILLUSTRATIONS ARE PRESENTED SOLELY FOR PURPOSES OF CLARIFICATION.

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9. IN THE LIKELY EVENT THAT THE SOVIETS RAISE THE QUESTION OF PRECIPITATION MODIFICATION ALONG THE LINES OF ITS USE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE DELEGATION SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE US PLACES SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE FACT THAT THE AGREED JOINT STATEMENT WAS CONCERNED WITH ACTIVITIES HAVING WIDESPREAD, LONG LASTING OR SEVERE EFFECTS.

10. THE DELEGATION SHOULD FOCUS THE TALKS ON THE QUOTE USE UNQUOTE OF MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES, NOT ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. IF QUESTIONS SHOULD ARISE CONCERNING THE LATTER, THE DELEGATION COULD POINT OUT THE INTRINSICALLY DUAL (CIVIL OR MILITARY) APPLICABILITY OF MUCH RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION AND THE LIKELY IMPRACTICABILITY OF VERIFYING A BROAD PROHIBITION OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.

11. THE DELEGATION SHOULD ELICIT SOVIET VIEWS CONCERNING VERIFICATION.

12. THE DELEGATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO ENGAGE IN THE DRAFTING OF A TREATY, CONVENTION, OR OTHER BINDING ARRANGEMENT, AND MAY SOADVISE THE SOVIET SIDE. DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WHILE THE US DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A TREATY OR CONVENTION, THE US CANNOT AT THIS STATE PREJUDGE THE FEASIBILITY OF SUCH AN APPROACH.

13. WHILE POINTING OUT THAT THE APPARENT SCOPE OF SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION IS NOT IN OUR VIEW CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF THE AGREED JOINT STATEMENT, THE DELEGATION SHOULD EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO ANY EXPLANATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE SOVIET DRAFT WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE MAY BE PREPARED TO OFFER. THE DELEGATION SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, PERMIT THE SOVIET DRAFT TO BECOME THE FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR THE TALKS. THE DELEGATION MAY, AS APPROPRIATE, STATE THAT DEPENDING ON HOW THE SOVIET DRAFT IS CONSTRUED, THE US QUESTIONS WHETHER CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT WOULD SERVE THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN INTERESTS.

14. THE DELEGATION IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING DRAFTING CHANGES IN THE RESOLUTION INTRODUCED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE SOVIET UNION BUT MAY
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CALL ATTENTION TO OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE GA IN EFFORTS TO DRAFT AN APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION.

15. THE DELEGATION SHOULD THROUGHOUT EMPHASIZE THAT NO EFFECTIVE MEASURES CAN BE ACHIEVED AT THE CCD OR ELSEWHERE UNLESS THE US AND SOVIET UNION ARRIVE AT AN AGREED APPROACH.

16. THE DELEGATION SHOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN FURTHER BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON PURSUANT TO THE AGREED JOINT STATEMENT.

17. IF THE SOVIET SIDE DESIRES AN AGREED PRIVATE REPORT ON THE TALKS, THE DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN SUCH A REPORT: (A) THAT THE TALKS WERE HELD PURSUANT TO THE AGREED JOINT STATEMENT OF JULY 3; (B) THAT THE US SIDE PUT FORWARD (OR, IF SUCH IS THE CASE, THAT THE TWO SIDES AGREED ON) THE CONCEPT THAT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF POSSIBLE MEASURES SHOULD BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES IN ORDER TO RELEASE OR MANIPULATE NATURAL PROCESSES OR FORCES HAVING WIDESPREAD, LONG LASTING, OR SEVERE EFFECTS FOR PURPOSES OF DESTRUCTION OR DISRUPTION AGAINST AN

ADVERSARY; (C) THAT POSSIBLE MEASURES AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS WERE EXPLORED; AND (D) THAT AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO HOLD FURTHER TALKS. IN THE EVENT THAT ITEM (B) IS INCLUDED AS A STATEMENT OF US VIEWS RATHER THAN AN AGREED CONCLUSION OF THE TWO SIDES, THE DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT THE INCLUSION IN THE REPORT OF A SIMILARLY BRIEF CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS ADVANCED BY THE SOVIET SIDE.

18. ANY PUBLIC COMMUNIQUE RESPECTING THE TALKS SHOULD RELATE THE TALKS SPECIFICALLY TO THE AGREED JOINT STATEMENT OF JULY 3 AND SHOULD AVOID ANY IMPLICATION THAT THE TALKS WERE FOCUSED ON THE SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION. INGERSOLL

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